Summary. In economies with indivisible commodities, consumers tend to prefer lotteries in commodities. A potential mechanism for satisying these preferences is unrestricted purchasing and selling of lotteries in decentralized markets, as suggested in Prescott and Townsend [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . However, this paper shows in several examples that such lottery equilibria do not always exist for economies with finitely many consumers. Other conditions are needed. In the examples, equilibrium and the associated welfare gains are realized if consumptions are bounded or if lotteries are based upon a common "sunspot device" as defined by Shell [-mimeo, 1977] and Cass and Shell . The paper shows that any lottery equilibrium is either a Walrasian equilibrium or a sunspot equilibrium, but there are Walrasian and sunspot equilibria that are not lottery equilibria.
Introduction
In economies with non-convexities, it is often the case that consumers can benefit from having their final consumption determined by lottery. This idea, which does not depend on consumers having preferences favoring risk, is demonstrated in Prescott and Townsend [18] for private information economies, and in Rogerson [19] for economies with indivisible labor. More recently, Shell and Wright [22] explore the role for lotteries and sunspots (of the type introduced by Shell [21] and Cass and Shell [3] ) in markets with indivisibilities.
In this paper, the trading story of Prescott and Townsend is applied to a finite-consumer market with indivisible commodities. Economies are described for which consumers benefit by having their final consumptions determined by lottery, but such gains cannot be decentralized in a market with unrestricted purchase and the bound on the amount of consumption good j that may be consumed by consumers in the economy. Thus, there is a finite number of permissible consumption bundles in the economy, each of which corresponds to a point in ~es+ (the Cartesian product ofY'+, J times) with the first coordinate specifying the units of consumption good 1 and so on). Consumption bundles in the economy are described as elements of the set C = {cs~S+ :cj < b~, j = 1 .... , J} where c i denotes the (integer) amount of the consumption good j in consumption bundle c. Suppose the number of consumption bundles in C is equal to K. Denote the consumption bundles by c 1 ..... c k ..... c K, and consider each consumption bundle to be a different commodity. In particular, consumption bundle c k is commodity k, k = 1,..., K. This method of defining commodities comes from Prescott and Townsend [ 17] and [ 18] . Quantities of the K commodities are represented by points x = (x 1 ..... xK)e91K. Thus, 9~ K is the commodity space.
Without lotteries, consumers choose one of the commodities for consumption. Consumer preferences on bundles c k are given by utility functions U~(ck), ~J+ ~ ~, which are monotonically increasing in each of the j coordinates. On X~, this may be written equivalently as
k=l Prices of commodities are given by a price vector f = 9U+. The utility maximizing consumer solves
Given the definition of a commodity, a firm is needed to produce the commodities in the set C from the endowments. The firm's production set is
where z k is negative (respectively positive) if commodity k is used as an input (respectively output) in the production plan z. The production process is constant returns to scale and thus there is no loss in generality in assuming a single firm. The 298 R. Garratt profit maximization exercise of the firm is K max ~ fkzk (6) z k=l subject to zeZ.
Maximization by the firm places restrictions on the prices fk, that are presented in the following proposition. Proof. Suppose at prices f' that z' is a solution to equations (6)- (7) but that the proposition is not true. Then at prices f', z' is not a solution to the less-constrained problem
k=l ze~R K.
This is true, since the existence of ~0 j > 0, j = 1,..., J, that satisfy the condition of Proposition 1, is necessary for z' to be a solution to equations (8)- (10) . However, z' satisfies equations (9)-(10). Thus, there exists an alternative choice, z", that satisfies equations (9)-(10) but has
k=l k=l
In fact, we may choose z" to be a vector of rational numbers. This is true, since cke~ J implies any unique solution to equations (8)- (10) 
But this problem is equivalent to equations (6)- (7) . Therefore, we again have a contradiction. (6)- (7), and
Since Henry [10] it has been well known that a competitive equilibrium may not exist in economies with multiple indivisible consumption goods (i.e., where the number of divisible and indivisible consumption goods is greater than two). The existence of equilibrium is also addressed for economies with some divisible goods and some indivisible goods by Broome [2] and MasColell [13] . For economies in which all consumption goods are indivisible, the type considered here, the existence of equilibrium is addressed by Dierker [5] . Dierker proves the existence of allocations which are nearly price equilibria for large economies, in the sense that the percentage of unsatisfied demand gets arbitrarily small. He also proves that existence can be assured if consumers possess a certain degree of price insensitivity.
Trade with lotteries
In order to consider lotteries, extend the consumption sets X~ by relaxing the zero-one restrictions. The extended sets are W~= w~egt~ wi= .
k=l (16) Clearly X i is a subset of Wi. The idea of specifying the consumption set in this way comes from Prescott and Townsend [ 17] and [ 18] . The individual demands w~ W~ may be interpreted as lotteries where w~ is the probability of receiving the bundle c k as the final consumption. Consumer preferences over elements in their consumption sets (i.e., over lotteries) are given by functions v~(w~) as defined in Section 2. Note that consumers are now assumed to be expected utility maximizers.
The firm also has increased production possibilities. Their production set Z already contains a countable number of points, which can be denoted zl, z 2 .... z ...... In the lottery economy, the firm can also produce probability distributions over Z.
Let q)={~p={to._>O}~=l.~p = l}, where ~p~ denotes the probability attached 300 R. Garratt to production plan z.. The production set of the firm is Y={yEglK:y=~(p,Zn}, (17) where (p ~ @.
It is interesting to compare the production set Y to that described in Prescott and Townsend Section 4] for the continuum-of-consumers economy. In the latter case, inputs and outputs are defined in terms of signed measures. Thus the production set is Y= {~eL: j" cy(de) _< 0} (18) where L is a linear space. For economies in which there are a finite number of commodities (i.e., consumption bundles), k = 1 ..... K, the production set given by equation (18) becomes
As the following proposition reveals, the production sets Y and ~'contain the same points (although the interpretation of the points in the two sets differ depending upon the context).
Proposition 2. Y= Y..

Proof. See the Appendix. 9
Because Z = Y, Proposition 1 still holds, and any equilibrium prices f must be generated by shadow prices ~p. In view of the structure of prices, the consumer's problem is K max vi(wi) = ~. w~ui(c k) (20) 
k=l wi~W i. (22) This is a linear programming problem with two linearly independent constraints. Both this problem and the dual problem have feasible solutions, thus both have optimal solutions. Let for all k and for all i.
Conditions (iii) and (iv) are the feasibility conditions for an equilibrium state [(w*),~0*]. Together, they say that individual demands w k* must be marginal distributions of some joint probability distribution over purely feasible allocations I I for the whole economy.
necessary for a LE. However, they are clearly not sufficient.
It is now possible to address the issue of existence of a LE. Existence of a LE in this model is not guaranteed. Three examples are now provided which demonstrate this. In Example 1 an economy is considered where there are no gains to having individual consumers' final consumptions determined by lottery, but where the introduction of trade involving lotteries destroys any possible equilibrium. In Example 2 an economy is considered where there are welfare improving lottery allocations that cannot be decentralized without specific bounds on the amount of each consumption good. Finally, in Example 3 the implications of having consumers in the economy who are risk loving are explored.
Example I
Consider an economy with two consumers and two indivisible consumption goods. That is, commodities are consumption bundles in ~2. Let ul(c) = (c1)2/3(c2) 1/3 and Uz(C) = (c01/3(c2) 2/3. Let C = {c~ 2 :c 1 _< 3, c z <_ 3}. There are sixteen commodities. Their ordering is not important. However, it is useful to identify the following commodities: c1=(0,0), c/=(l,1), c3=(2,1), c~=(3,1), c5=(1,2), c6=(3,2), c7=(1,3), cS=(2,3), c9= (3, 3) . 1 Each consumer is endowed with one unit of commodity 2.
Normalize prices by setting ~b2= 1. In order to rule out the possibility of an equilibrium one must show that conditions (i) (iv) of Definition 2 are not satisfied for any ~a~9~+. The consumer's problem does not change if we drop the K zero-commodity from the set C and require ~ wki--< 1 for each consumer i. The k=2 advantage is that given our choice of preferences and endowments for each K consumer we are assured that the constraint ~ w k < 1 will never be binding and k=2 1 These sixteen commodities are identified in the same way throughout the rest of the paper. It is interesting to note that for this example there does exist an equilibrium if we assume a continuum of consumers with an equal measure (measure l) of each type. Then, the appropriate feasibility constraint is as specified in Prescott and Townsend [18] . At prices 0=(1,1) consumer 1 demands a lottery between 1 commodity 3 and commodity 1 with probabilities Wl 3 = ~ and w I = 1 respectively, while consumer 2 demands a lottery between commodity 5 and commodity 1 with probabilities w 25 _--52 and w~ = 5 ~ respectively. The production plan y3 = 5,2 y5 = -52 y2 = _ 2, yl = 2 and y~ = 0 for all other k maximizes the firm's profit at these prices. Futhermore, for these demands and production the resource constraint for the continuum-of-consumers economy is satisfied with an equality.
In Example 1 a LE does not exist for the two consumer economy. For arbitrary finite numbers of consumers a LE may or may not exist. ALE will exist at prices 0 = (1, 1) for all replications of the specified economy in which the number of consumers of each type is divisible by three. 3 
Example 2
Consider an economy with three consumers and two indivisible consumption demands commodity 21 with probability w z~ -> 0, which is not feasible.
44,1 +5 13
For .71 < 4,1 _<.79, consumer 2 demands commodity 13 with probability w 2 = 01+1 -->0, which is not feasible. For .79 <01 <_.89, consumer 1 demands 501 + 2 01 + 1 commodity 17 with probability wl 7->0, which is not feasible. For 501 +4
.89 < 01 < 1, consumer 3 demands commodity 20 with probability w~ ~ -01 + 1 -301+5 >0, which is not feasible. For 1 < 01 _< 1.12, consumer 2 demands commodity 14 with 0a+l probability w2 TM -> 0, which is not feasible. For 1.12 < 01 < 1.26, consumer 501 + 3 01 + 1 21 _ > 0, which is not feasible. 1 demands commodity 21 with probability w 1 401 + 5 For 1.26 < 01 < 1.5, consumer 3 demands commodity 19 with probability w~ 9 = 01+I -->0, which is not feasible. For 1.5 < 01__< 1.59, consumer 2 demands 201 +5 01+1 commodity 17 with probability w~ v = > 0, which is not feasible. not feasible. Therefore, we need only consider the case where w 1 01+ 2 3.55.52_2.55 At 01-consumer 3 demands commodity 7 with probability 2.53_3.55.5 ,
01+1
1 However, the demands 5 1 and 7 1 W3 7 = @ 1 +3 > ~" q,~+5
If we set the bounds on each consumption good to 3 or 4, then the preferred allocation can be achieved as part of a LE. Namely at prices ~ = (1, 1) , the feasible 911232 t=~,W5=_~ 1 1 allocation w~ = g, w x = g, w 2 = ~, w 2 w 3 = ~, is utility maximizing for each consumer and the implied production maximizes profits for the firm.
Example 3
Consider an economy with two consumers and two indivisible consumption goods.
Let Ux(C ) = (CLC2) 3/4 and u2(c ) = (qc2) 1/2. Suppose consumer 1 is endowed with 1 unit of commodity 5 and consumer 2 is endowed with 1 unit of commodity 3. It is clear that both consumers may gain through trade over lotteries. However, for any ~9t 2 the solution to consumer l's problem is for consumer 1 to demand as much probability as she can afford on the 'largest' commodity (with the desired ratio of the two consumption goods) in her consumption set. If consumers imagine they can buy commodities whose production requires more than the total resources of the economy, consumer l's demand will not be feasible. That is, a LE will not exist.
However, if we set bj = 3, j -1,2, then a LE can be achieved. To show this consider prices ~* =(~1,1//2)=(1, 1). Solving equations (20)- (22) we find that consumer 1 wishes to spend all her income on commodity 9. This amounts to 1 probability on commodity 9 and 89 consumer 1 demanding a lottery which puts probability on commodity 1. It is easily verified that this lottery also maximizes the expected utility of consumer 2. Let z 13 _-_ 1, z15 = _ 1, zll = 1, z19 = 1 and z~k = 0 for all other k. Then Zl is purely feasible. Also, q~' = 1 is profit maximizing at these prices. Let x1,1 be the point in A I that has x~1~.1 = 1, x~,l = 0 for all k r 1, x92,~ = 1, and x12,1k =Oforallkr Letx~,2bethepointinAl thathasx~l,
for all k r 9, and Xa2,2k = 0 for all k r 1. Then condition (iv) of Definition 2 is satisfied with 2* -1 and 2" = 89 Thus, there exists a LE.
In this context a feasible state (i.e., a state which satisfies conditions (iii) and (iv)) [(wl),~0] is a Pareto optimum if there does not exist an alternative feasible state [(w'i)~p'] with the property that vi(w'i)>_ v~(w~) for all i with a strict inequality for some i. Note that deterministic feasible states are included in this definition. Thus, states that were Pareto optimal under the previous specification of the consumption and production sets may no longer be Pareto optimal after we allow randomization. The fact that LE do not always exist suggests that in some cases there may be Pareto optimal states that cannot be decentralized as LE for any specification of endowments. This failure of the Second Welfare theorem is easily verified. In Example 1 the allocation w 2 = 1, i = 1,2, is Pareto optimal. However, we saw that there are no prices for which both consumers will demand commodity 2. This result does not depend on their initial endowments.
It is apparent that for a given finite-consumer economy with indivisible commodities a LE may or may not exist, Whether or not a LE exists depends on the composition of consumer characteristics in the economy and on the choice of bounds bj. Examples 2 and 3 demonstrate that introducing specific bounds on consumptions 1 1 Finally, note that x.,,eA, implies that ~ x,,,, <_ z, + ~ ~i for all t and n. By our It is thus clear that any LE is also either a WE or SE. In fact, as the following propositions illustrate, some allocations can only be decentralized if consumers are required to accept a common (possibly degenerate) randomization device.
Proposition 5. There exist economies for which WE exist that are not (deterministic)
LE for the same economies.
Proof. Consider the economy described in Example 1. It has been shown that a LE does not exist for this economy. However, consider prices t)* = (1, 1). Then autarky is a WE. 9 Proposition 6. There exist economies for which SE exist that are not (non-deterministic) LE for the same economies.
Proof. Consider the economy described in Example 2. It has been shown that a LE does not exist for this economy. Now suppose that trade takes place in terms of state contingent claims based on three equiprobable extrinsic states of nature, These results are analogous to results obtained by Peck and Shell [15] relating sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria for imperfectly competitive market games economies. Peck and Shell find that a correlated equilibrium to the market game is a sunspot or non-sunspot equilibrium to the related securities game but that the converse is not necessarily true.
Conclusion
The welfare gains obtainable by having final consumptions determined by lottery cannot always be attained via decentralized equilibria if trade occurs with unrestricted purchasing and selling of lotteries. Placing bounds on quantities of consumption goods may solve the problem but this leaves open the question as to how the bounds are determined. If consumers are restricted to lotteries that are defined in terms of a common, finite set of extrinsic states of nature, a sunspot equilibrium can exist for economies that have no lottery equilibrium. In fact, sunspot-economies with a continuum of extrinsic states of nature permit no fewer equilibria than exist in lottery-economies since the state-contingent prices in the sunspot-economy may vary across states.
Nevertheless, some important questions remain unanswered. For instance, how is the probability space in the sunspot trading story selected? From a social planner's point of view this would be dictated by the particular Pareto optimal state one wishes to achieve. But this does not explain how market participants would coordinate themselves on a particular sunspot variable, or whether state contingent prices can always be found such that individuals will demand the proper allocation.
Given the difficulty of decentralizing lottery allocations, instances where consumers band together to form explicit lottery contracts are not surprising. An example in this spirit is provided by rotating savings and credit associations. Rotating savings and credit associations are organizations that pool funds enabling members to make large indivisible purchases sooner than they would be able to on their own. These organizations are studied by Besley, Coate and Loury [1] who point out that the random procedures used to allocate funds may provide higher expected utility for participants than they would get from borrowing in perfect capital markets.
